The technology within this topic is restricted under the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR), 22 CFR Parts 120-130, which controls the export and import of defense-related material and services, including export of sensitive technical data, or the Export Administration Regulation (EAR), 15 CFR Parts 730-774, which controls dual use items. Offerors must disclose any proposed use of foreign nationals (FNs), their country(ies) of origin, the type of visa or work permit possessed, and the statement of work (SOW) tasks intended for accomplishment by the FN(s) in accordance with section 3.5 of the Announcement. Offerors are advised foreign nationals proposed to perform on this topic may be restricted due to the technical data under US Export Control Laws. The Need for Advanced Autonomy: The Air Force has gained wide interest in fully autonomous, unmanned air platforms operating in teams making collaborative decisions to successfully complete missions. Highest level, real-time decision making will be the responsibility of advanced autonomy. This autonomy will include both flight-level autonomy and mission-level autonomy. Flight-level autonomy functions will generate local commands that keep the vehicle operating safely. Mission-level autonomy functions will continuously deliver courses of action (COAs) to each platform in the fleet, commanding mission progress in real time. Although all vehicles in the fleet will have instantiations of the mission-level autonomy functions, COAs will typically be generated by a chosen fleet leader. The Need for Runtime Assured Autonomy: Autonomy approaches under current development can be highly complex and nondeterministic in their behaviors. AFRL is currently developing approaches for autonomously executed missions using complex event processing techniques. This class of autonomy will be difficult, if not impossible, to fully certify from an airworthiness perspective, and therefore cannot be trusted to correctly operate under all mission conditions. Further, the capabilities of artificial intelligence and autonomy are rapidly increasing with continually updated versions and design iterations expected to occur throughout the operational lifecycles of unmanned systems. Such protocols are clearly not amenable to the time consuming and expensive airworthiness certification process. To address this hurdle, Runtime assured autonomy (RTAA) functions will be needed to perform runtime monitoring of the autonomy and enact procedures to mitigate any adverse effects due to errors in the autonomy design. The safety and performance protections provided by RTAA will lessen the certification burden, allowing rapid fielding of autonomy functions. Topic Objective: The objective of this topic is to develop innovative approaches to RTAA systems that protect the individual platform and the fleet against undiscovered design errors in the autonomy functions. The focus should be on use cases in which the RTAA determines whether the autonomy is generating infeasible, incorrect, and/or non-optimal solutions (e.g., commanded paths or task allocation) that may affect mission progress and effectiveness.